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CONFLICT OF LAWS IN TIME: THE
SWEEP OF NEW RULES IN CRIMINAL
LAW*
ROGER J. TRAYNORt
W E WHO JOIN to honor Brainerd Currie know the great gifts
he brought to the law. Their benefits continue to multiply, for
he was a man of genius whose work affords us insights for resolving
some of our most troublesome legal problems. The very spirit of
gentleness, he was also a man of such happy temperament, of such
open heart and open mind, that he could have enlivened and en-
lightened any of the many mansions of the law. He was a superlative
teacher and practitioner and writer. No scholar in the land com-
manded more respect from judges; he would have been a superlative
judge. He was as profound in his understanding of the judicial
process as in his criticism of particular decisions. He accepted as a
fact of life the recurring gap between an ideal academic solution for
a hypothetical problem and an optimum judicial decision in a kin-
dred real controversy. His fine judicial sense is evident in all his
work, whether he is explicating admiralty or procedure or conflict of
laws. His Selected Essays on The Conflict of Laws,' constituting one
of his last gifts to the law, exemplify that judicial sense in a most
complicated area.
Brainerd Currie's own way of celebrating the completion of one
monumental task would be to turn his mind to a new one no less
challenging. So it is fitting that in tribute to him, we venture upon
such a problem today.
We have long recognized that the recurring head-on collisions
* Brainerd Currie Lecture delivered at the Duke Law School, May 11, 1967.
-j Chief Justice, Supreme Court of California.
a Published in 1965.
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between laws of different jurisdictions warrant study as a special
subject, which we call conflict of laws. That term of art encom-
passes what we might call wars in space. There are also recurring
wars in time, within the confines of a single jurisdiction, between
rules of law hallowed by usage and concepts ready to supplant them
by reason of their superior fitness to govern contemporary problems.
When such a concept emerges as a rule, should it operate only
prospectively or also retroactively?
Much depends on whether the new rule appears in a statute or in
a judicial decision, given the great difference between the legislative
process and the judicial process. It is common knowledge that a legis-
lature is free to make comprehensive changes in the law even if there
is no thread of transition between new laws and old. A court has no
such freedom. It works within the narrow confines of the case before
it, deciding it in the main on the basis of precedent that it sometimes
clarifies or amplifies. It overrules only rarely, when a precedent
appears incurably defective or obsolete.
Given the freewheeling, forward-looking nature of legislation, it
is appropriately given prospective application only, as a general rule
admitting of few exceptions, a rule secured in many constitutions by
an ex post facto clause as well as by clauses that compel due process or
preclude impairment of contracts. Conversely, a judicial decision,
even one that overrules a hitherto governing precedent, is appropri-
ately given retroactive application, in the main a practice admitting of
exceptions to preclude undue hardship upon those who have reason-
ably relied on the old precedent.2
A notable exception in our time to immediate retroactive applica-
tion occurred in the case of Brown v. Board of Education.3 In
declaring the state action in question unconstittional, the court
announced that its decision should be implemented with all delib-
erate speed. Recognizing the need for a two-way stretch in time to
mitigate the problems of a transition that would involve millions of
people, it reconciled the retroactivity usually attending a declaration
of unconstitutionality with a phrase that enabled its new rule to take
effect in slow motion.
In contrast, time has the aspect of an hour-glass in criminal law.
,'See Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, - ARK. L. REV. - (1967),
an address delivered at the University of Arkansas School of Law, May 9, 1967.
* 347 U.S. 483 (1954), rehearing on appropriate relief, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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In no other area of constitutional law is the problem of retroactive
versus prospective application of such crucial importance. The time
radius of the decision may directly affect the freedom or the very
life of one accused or convicted of crime. An ex post facto clause
hence exerts its most dramatic prohibition against retroactivity with
regard to statutes that make conduct criminal that has not been
criminal before. Though there is no comparable prohibition on a
court,4 it usually also guards against any retroactive application of a
decision that marks conduct as criminal for the first time.
In an unusual early case in North Carolina" the court found its
rationale for prospective application only in the defendant's reliance
on an old interpretation of the law. He had been prosecuted under
a statute prohibiting unauthorized removal of crops by a share-
cropper. An earlier case6 involving the same statute had held that
a sharecropper might defend by alleging the landlord's breach of
contract as offsetting the amount of rent due. The court overruled
the earlier decision, holding that the statute plainly meant that the
crops were to remain on the land until all disputes between landlord
and sharecropper were resolved and that any removal of the crops
pending such settlement was a penal offense. The court went on to
hold, however, that since the defendant might have acted on the ad-
vice of counsel in reliance on the earlier case, it would be unfair to
deprive him of the defense authorized by that case.
Normally, however, reliance plays an inconsequential role, if any,
in criminal cases, as in tort cases. The decisive factor is usually the
injustice of retroactivity, dramatized by its penal consequences, as
exemplified in the more recent case of James v. United States.7 At
issue was the conviction of a defendant for "wilfully and knowingly"
failing to pay an income tax on embezzled money. In an earlier
case8 the United States Supreme Court had held that embezzled funds
were not taxable income. Six members of the court in the James case
voted to overrule that decision, holding that embezzled funds were
taxable income. A differently composed group of six justices, how-
' E.g., Frank v. Mangum, 257 U.S. 509, 543-44 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150,
161-64 (1913).
* State v. Bell, 136 N.C. 674, 49 S.E. 163 (1904).
* State v. Neal, 129 N.C. 692, 40 S.E. 205 (1901).
'366 U.S. 213 (1961).
S Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946); see Comment, Prospective Overruling
and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 924 (19621.
Vol. 1967: 7131]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ever, voted not to convict James: three on the ground that the old
rule still prevailed when he failed to pay the tax, and hence made
it impossible to prove wilful evasion; and three on the ground that
the old rule was correct. Accordingly, there was no retroactive appli-
cation of the new interpretation of the tax statute. It is hardly
persuasive that James failed to report his income in reliance on the
old rule; there was an equal likelihood that he concealed his income
to avoid prosecution for embezzlement. Though no element of reli-
ance is present, the James decision is responsive to the principle that
the retroactive operation of a rule imposing or expanding criminal
liability would be inherently unjust.
In a few jurisdictions, courts may convict persons of crimes even
though the conduct charged against them is nowhere specified by
statute as criminal. These jurisdictions punish so-called "common
law offenses," acts that fall expressly or by analogy within some com-
mon law decision, however ancient and obscure.9 Predominantly
they are acts characterized as immoral, obscene, or in some such wise
offensive. Thus a 1939 Maine decision 0 convicted a defendant of
disposing of a human body by burning it in a household furnace.
The court stated that the common law gives expression to people's
changing customs and sentiments, and that acts which are highly in-
decent and contra bonos mores are therefore crimes.
Some jurisdictions penalize such acts under very general statutes
covering conduct against public morality, or under conspiracy pro-
visions penalizing agreements to carry on lawful acts in an unlawful
manner or to injure or corrupt the public good. In a 1932 Oregon
case, Multnomah County Fair Association v. Langley," the court
enforced a broad criminal nuisance statute directed against "any act
which grossly injures the person or property of another, or which
grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly outrages
public decency and is injurious to public morals .. .."12 With com-
parable sweep, a Kentucky court in 1933, in Commonwealth v.
*See 21 AM. Jun. 2d Criminal Law § 10 (1965).
so State v. Bradbury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (1939).
1x 140 Ore. 172, 13 P.2d 354 (1932).
12 Ore. Code § 14-722 (1930). An analogous provision still exists. ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 161.310 (1953). See State v. Elliott, 204 Ore. 460, 277 P.2d 754 (1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 929 (1955) (upholding a conviction under the act for operating an abortion
clinic over a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness resting on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's due process clause); State v. Dewey, 206 Ore. 496, 292 P.2d 799 (1956) (same).
[Vol. 1967: 713716
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN TIME 717
Donoghue,13 held an agreement to commit usury to be a criminal
conspiracy, although usury itself was legal.
These so-called "morals offenses" create refractory problems of
retroactivity. Usually a defendant cannot divine that a decision
will make criminal the very conduct he is engaged in. Retroactivity
in the common law of crime, attended by penal sanctions, may be
particularly oppressive when the defendant's conduct lacked any ele-
ment of mens rea. It is reasoning in a circle to attribute conscious-
ness of wrongdoing to a defendant on the sole ground that since his
conduct is now adjudged offensive to widely held community stan-
dards of basic morality, its criminal nature should have been known
to him.
It may avail little to a defendant to exercise his right to a jury
trial when charged with an allegedly criminal offense, not against a
person or property, but against the abstraction of public morality.
Given that indeterminate abstraction, twelve randomly selected jury-
men have the same large discretion as a trial judge to adjudge con-
duct criminal that has nowhere in law been so specified.
Judicial discretion, whether of trial judge or jury, is also an in-
determinate abstraction elusive of constitutional limitation. An
appellate court is wary of countermanding the discretionary judg-
ment of the triers of fact unless there is patent abuse of their dis-
cretion, a phrase whose own vagueness matches the abstraction to
which it relates. Thus two indeterminate abstractions, one encom-
passing conduct allegedly criminally offensive and the other encom-
passing judicial discretion to adjudge conduct as criminally offensive,
interact to create a vicious circle. It might better be described as a
vicious vortex, into whose vacuum every person risks being drawn.
It is a very present danger, an omnipresent one, whose sinister as-
pects ironically are camouflaged by the ceremonious judicial process
through which it moves. The courtroom, whose judge and jury are
regarded as the intent guardians of fair procedure, lends itself to a
vitiation of that procedure whenever the guardians freely invoke their
discretion to stigmatize conduct as criminal and to apply the punish-
ment retroactively.
Transcending the injury to the one thus condemned by the erratic
operation of judicial fiat is the oppressive censorship it threatens to
all others. Even if the threat does not materialize immediately or on
1s 250 Ky. 343, 63 S.W.2d 3 (19331.
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a large scale, it exerts a damaging influence against the diversity of
custom and thought that characterizes the open pluralistic society.
Those aware of the threat tend to stifle themselves, to fit their con-
duct to prevailing patterns, to speak only the speech of the sickly
sweet lest they offend a majority well able to mobilize its deadly
innocence against any questioning words.
As for those who are not aware of any threat, or are not in fear
of it, they risk more imminent injury. The first among them to be
criminally prosecuted may be those whose offenses are so close to
specified crimes as to seem properly punishable. But each such pun-
ishment broadens the area of prosecution and the number of those
who may be caught in it. No one can forget that in our own time,
in purportedly civilized countries, millions have thus been caught
who have committed no greater offense than to be themselves.
In the recent case of Ginzburg v. United States,'4 three of the
four dissenting justices viewed the majority decision as a retroactive
expansion of criminal liability for conduct not hitherto specified as
a crime. The decision, interpreting a federal statute on obscenity,' 5
adjudged defendants guilty of mailing obscene matter. Even though
the majority opinion assumed that the magazines actually mailed were
not obscene, it attributed to the mailing an obscenity derived from
the manner in which they were advertised and prepared for mailing.
Thus it greatly broadened the sweep of an already sweeping statute.
Something new has been added to the normal question under such
a statute: What was defendant doing? It is now in order in the
courtroom also to ask: What did he think he was doing?
With this subtle interpolation of motive in a statute on its face
concerned only with obscene matter, whatever that vague term may
mean, what are the limits of the growth possibilities of obscenity
as a crime? Those who prosecute for obscenity need not prove that
the defendant was murdering the English language or even roughing
it up. The crucial question is not only how the defendant conducts
himself, but whether his motive was pure. Evil to him who evil
thinks.
The pudding, of course, is in the proof. Since the proof of evil
motive is now called for by the statute, Ginzburg could become an
endless pudding, spilling little ones into every corner of the land. It
" 383 U.S. 463, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 934 (1966).
15 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1964) .
718 [Vol. 1967: 713
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is not quieting to envisage the many custodians who now stand ready
to put in their plums, and pull out their thumbs, and say: What a
good boy am I.
Our plum puddings are not more spectacular than those of the
mother country. The Ginzburg case finds a foggy peer in the British
case of Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions,"6 highlighting the
durability of the conspiracy net in common law. The defendant pub-
lished a "Ladies Directory," listing the names and addresses of
prostitutes. He was convicted of publishing an obscene booklet un-
der the Obscene Publications Act of 1959, superseding common law
rules hitherto governing obscene publication. He was also convicted
of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, an offense declared by the
trial judge to be a common law misdemeanor. The Court of Crim-
inal Appeals affirmed the conviction and the House of Lords re-
affirmed. In the reaffirmation, the majority adhered to a view of the
court as custos morum of the people's morality, as they say in English,
or as the Latins might say, the moral custodian. There was an oddly
archaic sound to the purportedly forward-looking speech of several
that equated the conspiracy conviction with the right and duty of
the court to keep the common law of crimes responsive to current
public policy. Thus Viscount Simonds declared that "The law must
be related to the changing standards of life, not yielding to every
shifting impulse of the popular will but having regard to funda-
mental assessments of human values and the purposes of society."' 7
What of decisions that contract criminal liability? In such a
case retroactivity would be beneficent rather than harsh. Contrac-
tion of criminal liability can take various forms: a court declares a
criminal statute unconstitutional; a legislature repeals a criminal
statute expressly or by implication, or repeals a statute and later sub-
stantially re-enacts it; or a court reinterprets a criminal statute to
the advantage of defendants, either by narrowing the scope of the
statute or by articulating new defenses to it. These examples each
warrant examination.
In the simplest example, when a court declares a criminal statute
unconstitutional, the invariable rule is that all defendants previously
convicted under that statute are entitled to release, whether their
convictions are final or not. This rule is at least as old as the 1879
10 [1961] 2 Weekly L.R. 897 (H.L.).
17 Id. at 917.
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case of Ex parte Siebold,18 in which the Supreme Court declared that
a conviction under an unconstitutional statute is void and therefore
subject to collateral attack.
As for legislative repeal of a criminal statute, it was normally
attended at common law by automatic abatement of all prosecutions
under it, on the presumption that the legislature intended repeal to
operate as a pardon for past acts.19 Abatement did not extend, how-
ever, to final convictions, probably because of the originally limited
nature of habeas corpus and the general unavailability of remedies
via collateral attack in early Anglo-American criminal law. More-
over, there was no abatement when the legislature clearly could not
have intended a pardon, as when the new statute merely affected the
manner of punishment, or merely took over the field from the old,
or substantially re-enacted the old, as in the case of codifications,
consolidations, or revisions.
The problems of legislative repeal are exemplified in two modem
cases decided by the United States Supreme Court, the "sit-in" cases of
Bell v. Maryland20 and Hamm v. City of Rock Hill.2 1 In Bell v.
Maryland, "sit-in" demonstrators had been convicted of criminal
trespass. While their case was pending on writ of certiorari in the
Supreme Court, the Maryland legislature enacted "public accommo-
dation" laws that gave them a right to be in public restaurants
and therefore probably rendered their supposed trespass noncriminal.
Like many states, Maryland had a "saving clause" to avoid the
common law rule of automatic abatement on repeal, but there was
some doubt whether the clause applied to petitioners' convictions.
The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded to the Mary-
land court to determine whether under state law the prosecutions
against petitioners might be deemed abated under the new statute.
The Maryland Supreme Court affirmed their convictions. 22
In contrast, in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill,28 petitioners' "sit-in"
conduct had been rendered noncriminal by a federal statute, the
18 100 U.S. 371, 376-77.
*See Sekt v. Justice's Court, 26 Cal. 2d 297, 304-05, 159 P.2d 17, 21, cert. denied,
326 U.S. 756 (1945).
2o 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
21 379 U.S. 306 (1964). In addition, see Blow v. North Carolina, 379 U.S. 684 (1965)
(per curiam).
22 Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54 (1964).
22 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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1964 Civil Rights Act.24 The United States Supreme Court held that
the convictions, still on direct review when the Civil Rights Act was
enacted, were abated by the federal statute rendering their conduct
noncriminal.
An analogous situation arises when a court reinterprets a crim-
inal statute so as to narrow it, thus essentially repealing the statute as
to some defendants. In this area the decision in Warring v. Colpoys 25
has aroused much criticism. A defendant had been convicted in 1939
under a federal contempt statute that punished conduct in the
presence of the court or "so near thereto" as to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. At the time of defendant's conviction case law
required a causal rather than a geographic link between the offending
conduct and the offended court.26 Two years after Warring's convic-
tion, however, the Supreme Court reversed itself, holding that the
contempt statute required geographic proximity between conduct
and court.27 Under this new interpretation Warring might not have
been guilty of criminal contempt, but the court denied habeas corpus.
A comparable decision has recently been rendered by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth ex rel. Almeida v. Rundle.28
Petitioner had been convicted of first degree felony-murder in the
course of robbery. His victim, a policeman, had actually been killed
by a bullet from the gun of a fellow policeman during the fracas of
the robbery. Long after petitioner's conviction the Pennsylvania
court, in Commonwealth v. Redline,29 adopted a new theory of
felony-murder that could have removed his crime from that category.
The Pennsylvania court, however, denied habeas corpus, holding that
criminal convictions are to be governed by the law in force at the
time of the conviction. The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.80
Sometimes there are legislative changes in punishment. They are
usually subject to a rule precluding retroactive application to de-
fendants whose convictions have become final. Such a rule is of
course inevitable as to increases in punishment, whose retroactive
" 78 Stat. 243-44, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964).
'" 122 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 678 (1941), discussed in Comment,
71 YALE L.J. 907, 940 (1962).
so See Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
27 See Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
2s"409 Pa. 460, 187 A.2d 266, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 815 (1963).
2* 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
s0374 U.S. 815 (1963).
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application would not be constitutionally permissible under the usual
ex post facto clause. As to statutes mitigating punishment, however,
there is no constitutional barrier to retroactive application, and there
are compelling arguments in its favor. Once the legislature adopts
a lesser penalty as adequate, the retention of a harsher penalty no
longer serves any legitimate penological goal. Hence we declared in
California, in In re Estrada,*3 that when a criminal statute is amended
to mitigate punishment after the prohibited act was committed but
before a final judgment of conviction is entered, the amended statute
governs.
The rationale of Estrada would seem to be equally applicable
to a defendant whose judgment of conviction has become final. An
early case decided otherwise. In 1831, in State v. Addington,3 2
petitioner was convicted of horse stealing and sentenced to death.
Meanwhile an amendment to the penal statutes reduced the punish-
ment to whipping, imprisonment, and a fine. The court refused to
apply the lesser punishment retroactively on the ground that it loses
all power over a case once a judgment becomes final. It nevertheless
recognized the harshness of this rule and strongly recommended
executive clemency.
Modern decisions extending the scope of habeas corpus have
militated against such unbending finality of judgments in criminal
law. Moreover, in states such as California, a system of indeter-
minate sentencing serves to keep a petitioner's case open. The
Adult Authority may redetermine his sentence at any point up to
maximum term.33
One can roughly generalize from the foregoing survey that the
traditional defenses against retroactivity of new rules of criminal law
that would adversely affect a defendant are still firmly entrenched.
There may be a trend, in nonconstitutional cases, toward retroactivity
of new rules that would beneficently affect a defendant. The
maverick domain of vague offenses against public morality is so un-
ruly as to defy prediction. If skirts continue to grow shorter, how-
ever, and rules of morality longer, everyone may have to become his
sister's keeper to keep her out of the clutches of the law as it makes
increasingly proper advances.
81 63 Cal. 2d 740, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (1965). See also People v. One
1953 Buick, 57 Cal. 2d 358, 19 Cal. Rptr. 488, 369 P.2d 16 (1962).
82 11 S.C. 516 (1831).
8 CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1168, 3020, 3023, 5077.
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We now turn to the cluster of recently formulated constitutional
rules relating to criminal detection, detention, and trial.34 They
have aroused national attention, engendering bitter debate between
the turbid woe-cryers who denounce the rules as criminal-coddling
and the turgid enthusiasts who hail them as bulwarks against op-
pression. Our task is to get down to cases.
Their common problem is the integrity of the fact-finding process
from its inception in criminal detection through detention and trial.
They begin with the Bill of Rights as applied to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment, an application that has gained momentum
since the propelling concept of ordered liberty enunciated in Palko
v. Connecticut.35 They culminate in rules that would be beneficent
to the defendant if retroactively applied.
It would seem that since the new rules have a common ground
in the concept of ordered liberty, defined as proceeding from the
conscience of mankind, they would by definition be of universal
application. Hence they would reach backward in time as well as
forward, to apply retroactively even though they might upset final
judgments. Thus the United States Supreme Court declared in 1963
that "conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged."36
Since that declaration the Court has applied some but not all of
the beneficent rules retroactively. Why not all? The question is
basic, compelling us to seek out the considerations that in some cases
dictated prospective operation only.
There is an opening clue, which in the final analysis fails to
yield a complete explanation. We find that in some of the cases the
preoccupation is to deter oppressive police practices or prosecution
procedures that constitute a long-range danger to the community.
In others the preoccupation is to guard against convicting the inno-
cent. The difference is only one of emphasis, on one side of the
coin or the other of the integrity of the fact-finding process, insofar
" See Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and
Trial, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 657 (1966), Twenty-third Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lec-
ture delivered at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York on April 19, 1966.
8 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Although the members of the Supreme Court may agree
that a particular right is fundamental and therefore within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment, their views differ as to how that result should be reached. See Henkin,
"Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963).
so Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963).
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as we view the cases solely in their abstract relation to ordered liberty.
The difference may widen, however, if we also weigh the immedi-
ate practical effects of retroactive or prospective operation of a benef-
icent new rule. There is a graphic illustration in Mapp v. Ohio,T
which extended the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the
states through the ordered liberty route of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The objective of the Mapp rule was to deter unreasonable
searches and seizures by excluding the resulting evidence at the trial.
There was no question as to the reliability of the evidence and hence
no corresponding danger of convicting the innocent.
Mapp generated concern throughout the country as to whether
it would apply retroactively not only to cases on appeal but also to
final judgments. In my own state I confronted the problem in a
concurring opinion in In re Harris.38 Some years earlier, in People
v. Cahan,39 California had anticipated the Mapp decision by adopting
the exclusionary rule. Instead of making it a rule of constitutional
dimension, however, we made it a rule of evidence; hence its viola-
tion afforded no ground for collateral attack on final judgments. It
was perforce turned into a constitutional rule by Mapp, and the
question arose as to whether it must now apply retroactively. In
deciding against retroactivity, in In re Harris, I noted that the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is not to protect the guilty but to deter
unconstitutional police practices. It seems clear that "Deterrence
would be served but little more and at exorbitant cost by affording
the weapon of collateral attack to those defendants who were con-
victed before the adoption of any exclusionary rule and hence had no
way of challenging the admissibility of the evidence. To begin with,
their cases are history, and they should not now be given the power
to rewrite it. To place at the disposition of the guilty an extraordi-
nary remedy designed to insure the protection of the innocent would
be to invite needless disruption in the administration of justice."*40
It must be remembered that
The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of
conviction is that it operates to eliminate the risk of convicting the
innocent. Such a risk attends any conviction ensuing from the
witting use of perjured testimony, the suppression of evidence, an
1 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 56 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 16 Cal. Rptr. 889, 890, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (1961).
' 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
40 Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 341.
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involuntary confession, the denial of an opportunity to present a
defense, and the denial of the right to counsel. A comparable risk
arises upon a failure to provide an indigent defendant with a trial
transcript necessary to perfect his appeal.
The most telling distinction of a defendant convicted on evi-
dence resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure is that he is
clearly guilty. It is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule to
protect the guilty. Its purpose of deterring lawless law enforce-
ment will be amply served in any state . . . by affording defendants
an orderly procedure for challenging the admissibility of the evi-
dence at or before trial and on appeal.4 '
The views set forth in the Harris case gained strength when the
United States Supreme Court in Linkletter v. Walker4 2 decided
against any retroactive application of Mapp that would upset final
judgments that became final before Mapp. It invoked as a test "no
likelihood of unreliability"4 8 in the fact-finding process. Given re-
liability, the court was free to weigh official reliance and the ad-
vantages of orderly transition against the usual factors in favor of
retroactive application of judicial rules.
The Fourth Amendment cases demonstrated that rules of ordered
liberty might operate with less than absolute retroactivity, however
absolute a ring they had in the abstract. New problems of retro-
activity were soon to arise in the now famous cases that have worked
basic changes in criminal procedure through the usual ordered lib-
erty route of the Fourteenth Amendment. When Malloy v. Hogan"4
extended the Fifth Amendment to the states, it cast a formidable
shadow on a rule followed in six states allowing comment on the
defendant's failure to take the stand to explain or deny facts when
he could reasonably be expected to do so.45 Nevertheless, we still
felt free in California to uphold such a rule in People v. Modesto,46
reaffirming the validity of a state constitutional provision that allowed
restricted comment on the silence of a defendant in a criminal trial.47
Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court declared the rule
unconstitutional in Griffin v. California.48 It relied at least in part
'
1 1d. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
'p381 U.S. 618 (1965) .
'
8 Id. at 638.
"378 U.S. 1 (1964).
* See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 611-12 n.3 (1965).
"462 Cal. 2d 436, 42 Cal. Rptr. 417, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
" CAL. CONST., art. I, § 13; see CAL. PEN. CODE, § 1323.
8 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
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on the theory that the comment rule impaired the reliability of the
fact-finding process. Given this relation back to the Linkletter test,
it seemed logical that the Griffin rule would be given the retroactive
application adumbrated in the Linkletter test. In the subsequent
case of Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,4 9 however, the court
considered the appropriateness of retroactivity under a new test: Was
there a "clear danger of convicting the innocent" unless there were
retroactive application of the beneficent new rule?50 This language
is not a restatement on all fours with the Linkletter test: Would there
be "no likelihood of unreliability," in the fact-finding process, and
hence no likelihood of convicting the innocent if there were no retro-
active application?
The Supreme Court itself was cognizant in Johnson v. New
Jersey5' that the Tehan test had a narrower range of retroactive appli-
cation than the Linkletter test when it stated:
.0 . .we denied retroactive application to Griffin v. California
despite the fact that comment on the failure to testify may some-
times mislead the jury concerning the reasons why the defendant
has refused to take the witness stand. We are thus concerned with
a question of probabilities and must take account, among other
factors, of the extent to which other safeguards are available to
protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial.52
This restatement of the Tehan rule indicates the Court's disposi-
tion toward weighing the reliability of the fact-finding process in
terms of "probabilities" rather than automatically according a de-
fendant the benefit of retroactive application unless the probabilities
are equivalent to "no likelihood of unreliability." The Court thus
came to a reckoning with the repercussions of the Griffin rule, which
enabled defendants to invoke the Fifth Amendment with double-
barreled effect. A defendant who testified could plead that he did
so under compulsion to avoid comment. A defendant who remained
silent could plead that he did so at the cost of such comment. Con-
ceivably some might plead that they had sought to avoid comment
on a serious charge by pleading guilty to a lesser offense.
It was no easy matter for the Court, after it had taken its stand in
'l 382 U.S. 406 (1966); see also In re Gaines, 63 Cal. 2d 234, 45 Cal. Rptr. 865, 404
P.2d 473 (1965).
0 Id. at 416.
81384 U.S. 719 (1966).
15 Id. at 729.
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Griffin against comment, to decide in Tehan against the retroactivity
of the Griffin rule. The Tehan decision involved some decom-
pression in the mold of the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Whatever the bends of decompression, they were the
inevitable sequence of a drastic change to preclude its becoming so
hard and fast a rule as to wreak havoc with final judgments in the
jurisdictions that had allowed comment.53
Once the Court undertook such adjustment, it gained freedom to
decide against any retroactive application of the new rules on police
interrogation announced in the historic cases of Escobedo v. Illinois54
and Miranda v. Arizona.5 It came as a surprise, however, that when
it did so in Johnson v. New Jersey,56 it specified a cutoff date that is
baffling except in terms of expediency. Even though the case arose
on habeas corpus and hence could have been governed by the Link-
letter and Tehan tests, the Court chose to reject the final judgment
cutoff.57 It held instead "that Escobedo affects only those cases in
which the trial began after June 22, 1964, the date of that decision.
We hold further," the Court stated, "that Miranda applies only to
" The implications of Tehan are explored by the dissenters in Spencer v. Texas,
385 U.S. 554 (1967). The majority in that case determined that it did not violate the
due process clause to inform the jury of prior convictions during the trial. The four
dissenters took the view that there was no rational basis in this case for admitting such
evidence prior to a finding of guilt and that to do so was therefore a denial of due
process. The dissenters disagreed, however, on the extent to which the admission of
evidence of prior convictions affected the reliability of the fact-finding process. Justices
Douglas and Brennan concluded, apparently on the basis of the Linkletter test, that
the fact-finding process was sufficiently impaired to compel retroactive application. 385
U.S. at 587. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Fortas, invoking the Tehan test, con-
cluded that Spencer did not differ materially from Griffin and that the reasonable
reliance of Texas officials on prior law militated against retrocative application. 385
U.S. at 583-87. Their disposition to give more weight to official reliance than to the
possibility of convicting the innocent may reflect an effort to gain acceptance of the
minority view via a rationale that would foster its prospective application only.
" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
" 384 U.s. 436 (1966).
" 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
""By final we mean where the judgment of conviction was rendered, the availability
of appeal exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari had elapsed . .. ." Link-
letter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 622 n.5 (1965). The California Supreme Court applied
this rule in People v. Polk, 63 Cal. 2d 443, 47 Cal. Rptr. 1, 406 P.2d 641 (1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1010 (1966). Judgment on the issue of guilt against defendants Polk
and Gregg was affirmed on March 31, 1964. Since Escobedo was decided on June 22,
1964, an application for certiorari could have been filed within the 90-day period
beginning on March 31. Although none was filed, the defendants were given the
benefit of the Escobedo rules because the California Supreme Court had decided on
the final-judgment cutoff for Escobedo. In re Lopez, 62 Cal. 2d 368, 42 Cal. Rptr. 188,
398 P.2d 380 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1016 (1966).
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cases in which the trial began after the date of our decision one week
ago. "58
The Court made this choice between the two alternatives it postu-
lated: whether the rules "shall affect cases still on direct appeal when
they were decided or whether their application shall commence with
trials begun after the decisions were announced."5 9  Apparently it
departed from the final judgment cutoff because it would have com-
pelled the Court to apply the Escobedo and Miranda rules to cases
then pending on appeal, something it did not wish to undertake.60
86 384 U.S. at 721.
s 384 US. at 732.
*0 In conjunction with fixing the prospective limitation line in Johnson, to ease
the jolt of transition to Escobedo and Miranda rules, the Court in Miranda and Johnson
narrowly construed the holding of Escobedo to minimize its impact.
The courts that had faithfully followed Escobedo and reversed judgments of
conviction accordingly, now learned that they need not have done so. The courts that
had resisted Escobedo now learned that it was possible to resist a Supreme Court
decision with impunity. See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 139
(1966).
In People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361, cert. denied,
381 U.S. 937, 946 (1965) we felt bound to decide Dorado "in conformity with the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. That court having declared the
content of a constitutional right, it is our function to enforce it in situations wherever
it logically applied." Id. at 357, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 181, 398 P.2d at 373.
The Dorado case presented a factual situation squarely within the holding of
Escobedo except for one factor: Dorado had failed to request counsel. Id. at 347, 42
Cal. Rptr. at 175, 398 P.2d at 367. It was settled law at the time of Escobedo and
Dorado, however, that the right to counsel did not depend on whether the accused
had retained or requested counsel. Id. at 350-51, 42 Cal. Rptr. at 176, 398 P.2d at
368; see Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (dissenting opinion); see also
People v. Roberts, 63 Cal. 2d 84, 93, 45 Cal. Rptr. 155, 161, 403 P.2d 411, 417 (1965), in
which the knowledgeable defendant, who had prior encounters with the police, requested
counsel during the police interrogation whereas codefendant Coleman, unversed in such
matters, failed to make such a request. It seemed inconceivable that in such a case the
Escobedo rule would operate for one defendant, but not for the other. It could hardly
be that a reprieve from a rendezvous with the death penalty would turn on the incanta-
tion of magic words.
The clarification in Miranda supported the correctness of Dorado. One week after
Miranda, however, the Court limited Escobedo to its specific narrow holding (Johnson
v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966)) and characterized Dorado as anticipating
Miranda, but as not "clearly foreshadowed" by Escobedo.
'[T]he refusal to apply Miranda to cases decided after Escobedo was handed
down will tend to frustrate the purposes of constitutional adjudication broadly con-
ceived. It will surely encourage law enforcement officials and lower courts to take a
restrictive view of constitutional decisions which they consider distasteful, since they
will be secure in the knowledge that convictions obtained by interpreting ambiguous
constitutional rules favorably to themselves will not be reversed. No bona fide reading
of the reasoning of Escobedo could have led to a construction much short of that
advanced in Miranda." The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra, at 139. See also
the reference to the New Jersey Supreme Court's actions in Comment, 64 MicH. L. REV.
832, 850 n.113 (1966).
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The Court's choice is hardly ideal, whatever its expediency.61
It meant that no cases would be reversed in consequence of the new
rule during the given transitional period. It is difficult to reconcile
the Court's own references to immutable principles and to binding
guarantees newly discovered in the century-old Fourteenth Amend-
ment with a declaration that they are to have no effect until
June 22, 1964.
Although this technique precludes the reversal of trial courts,
it places other appellate courts in an awkward position. The Consti-
tution is construed as clearly prohibiting a state from using im-
properly obtained confessions; but the constitutional prohibition
does not govern all the cases an appellate court might have before
it. Under the final judgment cutoff a court could refuse to hear
issues raised collaterally. Under Johnson, however, it must hear the
Escobedo-Miranda issues if they are raised. If the defendant un-
fortunately had a trial that started on the wrong day, the court then
confronts an unhappy choice. It must either deny such a defendant
the benefit of a constitutional rule, as the Supreme Court itself has
done, or accord him the benefit of the rule, as the Supreme Court
itself has not undertaken to do.
From among the cases pending that raised the Miranda issue,
the Supreme Court applied the Miranda rule to only four and denied
certiorari in the remaining 129 cases. 62 The denial of relief from
imprisonment or death on the basis of an arbitrary date raises a grave
question of equal protection. If those whose cases were pending
were reliably found guilty and hence did not deserve relief, the
inequity remains that a few among them nonetheless did receive
relief.68
So glaring an inequity is not dispelled by a rationalization that
the lucky few were only incidental beneficiaries of a technique de-
signed to avert wholesale reversals. For better or worse, the tech-
nique of the Johnson case is on the books, open to further use. We
*"Johnson may not have been the most desirable solution even in terms of ex-
pediency. An interrogation-date rule would have the advantage of equal applicability
to all defendants as to whom the state acted improperly and would still not penalize the
state for good faith conduct that was legal when it occurred. See State v. Gannites, 221
A.2d 620, 623-24 (R.I. 1966).
** See The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, supra note 60, at 141 & n.37.
68 See Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51
VA. L. REv. 201-05, 261-72 (1965); H. Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability and Due
Process: A Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 719, 733, 764 (1966).
Vol. 1967: 7131
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
can anticipate that it will be urged by advocates seeking to make
palatable a proposed change in criminal law or for that matter in
civil law. Thus a technique envisaged as an interim expedient may
invite carelessness, for it can be used to temporize whenever a new
rule is announced too precipitously for consistent and equitable appli-
cation.64
If there is to be more of such temporizing, who can say where it
will end? What is to stop Congress from stepping in with its own
timepiece to determine at what hour the shadow of any new judicial
rule should fall? Once it does, are there any limits on its authority
to tell the time?
Comparable questions as to the state legislature arose in Cali-
fornia in sequence of a judicial decision in a mundane field. The
Supreme Court of California overruled an old precedent on state
constitutional grounds that had governed the taxation of private
leaseholds in tax-exempt public property.6 5 It applied its new rule
retroactively after weighing the considerations pro and con. Then
the legislature came into the picture and after weighing the con-
siderations on its own scales retimed the new rule so that it would
not apply retroactively to leases negotiated prior to its adoption.
Was this legislative retiming of a constitutional rule constitutional?
When it was put to a judicial test in Forster Shipbuilding Co. v. Coun-
ty of Los Angeles66 our court upheld it, stating: "[T]emporary appli-
cation of the rule of an overruled case may be prescribed by appropri-
ate legislation as well as by judicial decision, for the Legislature is no
less competent than the court to evaluate the hardships involved and
decide whether considerations of fairness and public policy warrant
the granting of relief."67
Given faint echoes of Marbury v. Madison6 in this modern case,
it bears noting that the court itself did not make retroactivity a con-
stitutional mandate. It viewed retroactivity as a problem turning
on considerations of fairness and policy. This multiparous problem
begets many such considerations, and they may be as much the con-
cern of the legislature as of the court.
Cases may of course arise in which retroactivity is a constitutional
" See FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS, 266-84 (1967).
5 De Luz Homes, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 45 Cal. 2d 546, 290 P.2d 544 (1955).
"54 Cal. 2d 450, 353 P.2d 736 (1960).
7 Id. at 459, 353 P.2d at 741.
6 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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imperative, and the court specifies it as such. In such a case a legis-
lature would be bound by the retroactivity of the rule as much as by
the rule itself as the last word.
Our foremost legislature is of course Congress. In cases in
which retroactivity is not a constitutional imperative, it would
seem that Congress has freedom to make a Supreme Court rule
prospective only, on grounds of fairness or policy, even though the
court itself made the rule fully or partially retroactive.
It is relatively simple to consider the possibilities of setting a
judicial rule by legislative time in terms of a state legislature in
relation to a state's highest court or of Congress in relation to the
United States Supreme Court. It is confoundedly relative to
consider such possibilities in terms of a state legislature in relation
to the United States Supreme Court, assuming that Congress re-
mains silent. That query we leave to another day, preferably a
long one.69
The prospects are that it will be sooner than later that we shall
be confronting new problems in the relativity of time. 0 We shall
be fortunate indeed if a scholar appears to unriddle them with a
genius akin to that of Brainerd Currie.
"Traynor, The Well-Tempered Judicial Decision, - ARK. L. REV. - (1967).
70 A bill (H.R. 2508, § 2) now pending in the United States Senate would postpone
until 1972 the full impact of the decision that congressional districts be apportioned
according to the one man, one vote principle. Wesherry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 8, 18
(concurring opinion) (1964). It would permit congressional elections to be held even
in states having a 35% disparity among districts. Since the United States Supreme
Court itself authorized federal courts to weigh equitable considerations in timing the
redistricting in the states (Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964)), it would seem
that Congress also can weigh those considerations and fix the timing of the redistricting.
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